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| A woman carrying a USAID bag on June 18, 2021 in Mekelle, the capital of Ethiopia's Tigray region. JEMAL COUNTESS/GETTY IMAGES |
The
Ethiopian government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF)
unexpectedly agreed to end hostilities in what was widely seen as a diplomatic
breakthrough. After lengthy negotiations under pressure from the African Union
and the United States, the truce was finally struck in South Africa earlier
this month.
The
agreement, if put into effect, will hasten the delivery of relief and the
resumption of services in the Tigray region. Within thirty days of the agreement,
the TPLF will totally disarm. The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and
federal security and law enforcement organizations will be stationed in Tigray
by the federal government, and the ENDF will be stationed around international
boundaries, including Ethiopia's border with Eritrea.
The
prospect of silencing the guns in Tigray is commendable. But many articles in
the deal will be difficult to implement or may take months or even years to
carry out. That is largely because one of the main actors, Eritrea, was neither
represented nor mentioned by name in the agreement, although some indirect
references were made to it.
At
the signing ceremony, the TPLF’s chief negotiator, Getachew Reda, stated, “I
know there are spoilers from nearby, from inside our ranks and from the
neighborhood, and we also know they will … stop at nothing to sabotage our
peace-making efforts.”
Indeed,
Eritrea's secretive government has been essential to the conflict ever since it
began in November 2020. Between 1998 and 2000, Eritrea and Ethiopia fought a
border war, but it was really more of a conflict between the TPLF and Eritrea's
government. While Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki holds a personal grudge
against the TPLF, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed regards an armed TPLF as
a challenge to his authority. The only thing that binds them together is their
hatred for the TPLF.
Eritrea
may regard the disarmament of the TPLF as a positive development—but even so,
it has not yet accomplished its mission, which is destroying the TPLF once and
for all by capturing or killing its leaders, causing massive displacement, and
degrading its infrastructure and military capabilities so Tigray cannot be a
threat to Eritrea for at least the next 50 years or more. If Isaias continues
to pursue his ultimate goal, the truce could easily fall apart.
The
involvement of the Eritrean Army is not explicitly mentioned by either Ethiopia
or Eritrea. All of Eritrea's military actions are kept under wraps, and the
only Facebook page that has been updating its followers on the conflict is one
that is thought to be managed by Eritrean intelligence. It was foretelling
Mekelle, the capital of Tigray, falling at any moment during the conflict. In
its most recent posts, it refers to the peace agreement as "terms of
surrender" and claims that Ethiopia was forced to sign the agreement by
the US in order to save the TPLF.
There
is also very little information on the size of the Eritrean Army and extent of
its deployment in Tigray, but an estimate this year puts its size in the range
of 150,000 to 200,000 soldiers. Sources close to the TPLF estimate that half of
that force is in Tigray. But the military situation remains fluid, and there
could be troop repositioning following the deal. Meanwhile, special regional
forces and militias from Ethiopia’s Amhara region still occupy western and
southern Tigray.
The
international community and peace mediators have also underestimated Eritrea’s
role in the war. Calling on Eritrea to withdraw its forces will not deliver the
desired results. Sanctions have had little impact on the regime in recent
years; indeed, Eritrea’s regime has survived United Nations and U.S. sanctions
through a network of clandestine operations on illicit trade across Africa,
Europe, and the Persian Gulf.
According
to one of the agreement's clauses, subversion, the use of proxies to
destabilize the other party, and cooperation with any outside entity opposed to
either party are all examples of what is meant by "permanent suspension"
of all hostilities. This might indicate that Ethiopia can no longer work with
Eritrea to undermine the TPLF.
It
will be difficult for Abiy to honor this part of the deal, as he doesn’t
control the presence or conduct of Eritrean troops in Ethiopia. Even small acts
of sabotage could derail the peace process. Abiy doesn’t have complete control
over battlefield developments, as Eritrea’s generals operate outside the
Ethiopian command structure and appear to be spearheading the war effort in the
north.
Asmara’s
generals have been leading the fight on the northern front. They have also made
Eritrean territory a launching pad for Ethiopia’s army and a logistics and
command center, mobilizing its population and military. Current and former
generals confirm this fact.
Having
lost much of its operational capabilities and command structure—and many of its
military assets—after the TPLF’s takeover of Northern Command headquarters in
November 2020, the Ethiopian army was not in a position to enter Mekelle
without Eritrean support. Still, the ENDF has not yet completely reconstituted
to be capable of carrying out the most recent round of fighting without
Eritrea’s active participation.
Since
Aug. 24, when the new round of hostilities began, Eritrea’s regime has carried
out continuous and indiscriminate ground bombardments assisted by Ethiopian
aerial and drone attacks on towns and villages, causing large-scale casualties
and displacing Tigrayans. Those attacks continued 72 hours after the deal.
Eritrea’s army is deep in Tigray. The Eritrean military, accused of committing
grave atrocities, has invested a lot in this war and, according to Tigrayan
sources, has suffered heavy losses. Eritrea’s army will not pull back
willingly.
Eritrea’s
president views this conflict as a zero-sum game. His aim is to finish off the
TPLF once and for all. Therefore, Eritrea’s regime has taken unprecedented
measures to mobilize its remaining population. Eyewitnesses in Eritrea confirm
that families whose sons or daughters did not report to duty were evicted from
their homes. Some underage civilians and some older adults, all with little
training, were forced to join the army.
After
the ceasefire agreement, Abiy exclaimed that it had accomplished everything
Ethiopia had hoped for. According to a number of sources, Abiy and Isaias
intended to occupy Mekelle before the talks were finished and declare the war
to be over. But the Tigray Defense Forces put up a fight, making it difficult
for them to succeed.
The
issue for Ethiopia's administration is that Isaias can interpret Abiy's
cease-fire with the TPLF as a threat to Eritrea's interests.
Isaias
is a survivalist, and if he feels threatened, he might become more aggressive
in his attempts to destabilize Ethiopia by harboring and supporting proxies
groups who are antagonistic to the government there, as he has done for the
previous 30 years. Isaias has demonstrated time and time again that he is not
afraid to behave shamelessly when cornered. Indeed, the United Nations has
previously sanctioned Eritrea for its destabilizing role in the Horn of
Africa—from Somalia to Sudan and South Sudan.
Isaias
already hosts a Tigrayan armed group opposed to the TPLF. He could also support
the Oromo Liberation Army and an insurgent group in the Benishangul-Gumuz
region, where the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is situated. He could realign
with Egypt and Sudan against Ethiopia when it comes to the controversial
dam—which Cairo and Khartoum see as an existential threat to their water
supplies—as he has historically reshuffled friends and foes as necessary.
Russia may even reward Eritrea for its support in the United Nations regarding
the war in Ukraine with weapons and military training to help the regime
withstand Western threats.
Eritrea
currently hosts a Tigrayan armed insurgency group, known as Demhit, that is
opposed to the TPLF. It also considers the Amhara nationalists, particularly
the so-called Fano armed wing, as its allies. According to the Amhara
Association of America and a parliamentarian from the National Movement of
Amhara, the agreement failed to recognize the disputed areas with Tigray as
Amhara territory.
The
Fano—which committed atrocities, particularly in western Tigray, and has
displaced tens of thousands of Tigrayans—sees the agreement as a positive step
but is disappointed that the agreement upheld the current Ethiopian
Constitution, which it considers against Amhara interests. Eritrea has been
training the Fano, and Eritrea’s president could use the group to sabotage the
peace process from within. He has emphasized several times that he is opposed
to the federal arrangement in Ethiopia, as he would prefer a centralized
Ethiopia that is friendly to his regime.
The
TPLF has undermined Eritrea’s president for a long time and has paid an
enormous price for it. But this war has significantly weakened not only the
Ethiopian army and the TPLF but Eritrea’s army too. Ironically, Isaias may have
to depend on Abiy and the Ethiopian military—his sometimes ally but more often
rival—to protect his regime in the future if the deal with the TPLF fails.
The
threat Isaias poses to peace and stability in the region must first be
addressed if this peace accord, or any other peace agreement in the Horn of
Africa, is to work in the long run. Isaias and his closest accomplices need to
be personally sanctioned, among other much more forceful and harsh deterrence
measures. Such laws should also punish any organizations or people, including
Abiy and his associates, who try to undermine this budding peace deal that has
the power to change the region.
The
spoiler role Isaias has played in the Horn of Africa in the past—and the
possibility that he would do so again—must be understood by all parties who are
interested in the success of this peace pact.
Mohamed Kheir Omer is
a researcher and writer based in Oslo, Norway. He is a former member of the
Eritrean Liberation Front.
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